When Does Ranked-Choice Voting Reduce Polarization?

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[1]University of Houston
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Feb. 22, 2025
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University of Houston

software: {neodowns}

Primer

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
1st Choice
2nd Choice
3rd Choice
4th Choice
5th Choice
Candidate A
Candidate B
Candidate C
Candidate D
Candidate E

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

Number of ballots	Ranking profile
46	(A)
24	(B)
10	(C)
4	(C, B)
2	(E, A)
2	(E, C, A)
3	(E, D, C, A)
6	(D, A)
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

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

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

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	Round 1		Round 2		Round 3		Round 4	
Cand.	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
A	46	45.5%	48	47.5%	54	53.5%	63	69.2%
B	24	23.8%	24	23.8%	24	23.8%	28	30.8%
C	14	13.9%	16	15.8%	23	22.8%	*eliminated*	
D	10	9.9%	13	12.9%	*eliminated*			
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4. Repeat until the majority winner

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    - Compute levels of co-ethnic voting + ideological polarization via Markov chains, R package {neodowns}

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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